登录 | 注册 | 充值 | 退出 | 公司首页 | 繁体中文 | 满意度调查
综合馆
高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究
  • 摘要

    本文运用我国上市公司2002-2005年的面板数据,对我国上市公司高管人员股权激励与投资决策之间交互作用及内生关系进行了实证检验.得出了以下主要结论:实行股票增值权公司的投资量较其他激励模式公司的投资量更大;我国上市公司高管人员股权激励对投资有显著的正影响;我国上市公司投资对高管人员股权激励有显著的正影响;我国上市公司高管人员股权激励与投资满足内生决定关系.

  • 作者

    罗富碧  冉茂盛  杜家廷 

  • 作者单位

    重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400030/重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,400047

  • 刊期

    2008年8期 PKU CSSCI

  • 关键词

    股权激励  投资  交互作用  内生关系 

参考文献
  • [1] 唐雪松,周晓苏,马如静. 上市公司过度投资行为及其制约机制的实证研究. 会计研究, 2007,7
  • [2] 刘怀珍,欧阳令南. 经理私人利益与过度投资. 系统工程理论与实践, 2004,10
  • [3] 王艳,孙培源,杨忠直. 经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究. 中国管理科学, 2005,1
  • [4] 支晓强,童盼. 管理层业绩报酬敏感度、内部现金流与企业投资行为--对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的一个检验. 会计研究, 2007,10
  • [5] Hirshleffer D;Y.Suh. Risk,managerial effort,and project choice. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1992
  • [6] Holthausen R;D.Lareker;R.Sloan. Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compen-sation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1995
  • [7] Jeffrey L.Coles;Naveen D,Daniel. Lalitha Naveen.Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006
  • [8] Jensen M.C;Meckling W. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976
  • [9] Rajesh,Aggarwal. Empire -builders and shirks:investment,finn performance,and managerial incentives. 1999
  • [10] Smith C W;R.L.Watts. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing,dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 1992,12
  • [11] Sok-Hyon Kang;Praveen Kumar;Hyunkoo Lee. Agency and corporate investment:the role of executive compensation and corporate governance. Journal of Business, 2006,03
  • [12] Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers. American Economic Review, 1986,03
  • [13] Mehran H. Executive compensation structure,ownership and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995,06
  • [14] Myers Stewart C;Nicholas S.Majluf. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 1984
  • [15] 宋剑峰(2000)借助于Edwards-Bell-Ohlson模型显示:市净率是一个能较好预示公司未来成长性的指标,其研究结论得到了中国股市经验数据的支持.谢军(2006)以市净率为计量公司成长性的指标,检验了股利政策和第一大股东持股以及企业成长性机会之间的关系.
  • [16] Dechow P.M;R.G.Sloan. Executive incentive and the horizon problem. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1991
  • [17] Demsetz H;K.Lehn. The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 1985,12
  • [18] Harley E.Ryan Jr;Roy A.Wiggins. The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy. Financial Management, 2002
  • [19] 由于FGLS的估计结果与表7的结果大致相同,主要结论一致,限于篇幅,未列出FGLS的估计结果.
  • [20] Amihud.Y;B.Lev. Risk reduction as managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell Journal of Economics, 1981
  • [21] Campbell T;Y.Chan;A.Marino. Incentive contracts for managers who discover and manage investment project. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1989
查看更多︾
相似文献 查看更多>>
54.81.220.239