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"掏空"与所有权安排--来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据
  • 摘要

    本文以我国A股上市公司2000-2003年的关联交易数据为基础,对所有权结构与控股股东的掏空(Tunneling)行为之间的关系进行了实证分析.结果表明,控股股东占用的上市公司资金与第一大股东持股比例之间存在先上升后下降的非线性关系,但与其他股东的持股比例则表现出严格的负相关关系.另外,控股股东的控制方式以及产权性质也对其资金占用行为具有重要影响.其中,通过控股公司控制上市公司的控股股东占用的资金低于通过企业集团控制的上市公司,国有企业控制的公司的控股股东占用的资金高于非国有企业控制的上市公司.

  • 作者

    李增泉  孙铮  王志伟 

  • 作者单位

    上海财经大学会计与财务研究院/会计学院,200433

  • 刊期

    2004年12期 PKU CSSCI

  • 关键词

    掏空  资金占用  所有权安排 

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