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Ad Hoc网络中一种基于防策略支付模型的安全激励合作算法
  • 摘要

    Ad Hoc网络中节点之间的正常通信都是通过节点相互合作来进行中继转发.但是,Ad Hoc网络由于受到自身能量、可用带宽和计算能力的限制,节点往往表现出自私性,因此激励节点合作转发的积极性成为当前Ad Hoc网络的研究热点.该文基于算法机制设计中的思想,对Ad Hoc-VCG模型进行具体分析,指出其存在的问题,提出了一种防策略和防共谋攻击的支付模型,设计了一种包含路由建立和数据包转发过程的安全激励合作算法ICTP.最后,通过仿真实验来验证该算法的有效性,并与Ad Hoc-VCG、COMMIT和LMOCP算法进行了性能对比.仿真结果表明:ICTP算法较其它3种算法在性能上有了显著的改善.

  • 作者

    王博  黄传河  WANG Bo  HUANG Chuan-He 

  • 作者单位

    国家计算机网络应急技术处理协调中心 北京100029/武汉大学计算机学院 武汉430072

  • 刊期

    2012年7期 ISTIC EI PKU

  • 关键词

    Ad Hoc-VCG  防策略  激励合作  支付模型  共谋 

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